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THE MOST REVEALING WORD
IN THE

UNITED STATES REPORTS

I

Richard Primus†

T’S AT

567 U.S. 648, ABOUT A QUARTER of the way down the page.
But let’s lay some foundation first.
The most prominent issue in NFIB v. Sebelius1 was whether Congress’s regulatory power under the Commerce Clause stops at a point
marked by a distinction between “activity” and “inactivity.” According to
the law’s challengers, prior decisions about the scope of the commerce
power already reflected the importance of the distinction between action
and inaction. In all of the previous cases in which exercises of the commerce
power had been sustained, the challengers argued, that power had been used
to regulate activity. Never had Congress tried to regulate mere inactivity.
In NFIB, four Justices rejected that contention, writing that such a distinction
was previously unknown. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg described the idea of
an activity/inactivity distinction as a limit on the commerce power as “a
newly minted constitutional doctrine”2 conveniently engineered to declare
the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate unconstitutional.
†

1
2

Richard Primus is the Theodore J. St. Antoine Collegiate Professor at The University of Michigan
Law School. Copyright 2019 Richard Primus.
567 U.S. 519 (2012).
NFIB at 605 (Opinion of Ginsburg, J.).
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But five Justices – Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito – agreed with the challengers that commerce doctrine
regarded the distinction between activity and inactivity as significant. Unlike
the other four Justices, the Chief Justice did not think it followed that the
ACA was unconstitutional, because, unlike the other four Justices, the Chief
Justice concluded that Congress’s taxing power was sufficient authority for
enacting the ACA. But on the Commerce Clause question, these five were
in agreement: activity is one thing, and inactivity another. In his opinion
announcing the judgment of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts duly adduced
language from prior decisions to show that the Court had routinely spoken
of “activity” when sustaining exercises of the commerce power. The Chief
Justice wrote as follows:
As expansive as our cases construing the scope of the commerce
power have been, they all have one thing in common: They uniformly describe the power as reaching “activity.” It is nearly impossible to avoid the word when quoting them. See, e.g. [United States
v. Lopez] (“Where economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained”);
[United States v. Perez] (“Where the class of activities is regulated and
that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no
power to excise, as trivial, individual instances of the class”); [Wickard
v. Filburn] (“[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may
not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce”); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (“Although
activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered,
if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect
that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot
be denied the power to exercise that control”) . . . .3

The argument on offer is clear enough. By quoting the language of prior
cases, Chief Justice Roberts could rebut Justice Ginsburg’s charge that the
activity/inactivity distinction was “invented out of whole cloth[.]”4 On the
3
4

NFIB at 551 (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (emphases altered).
NFIB at 658 (Opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.) (describing Justice
Ginsburg’s characterization).
334

22 GREEN BAG 2D

The Most Revealing Word in the United States Reports
contrary, the prior cases’ use of the language of “activity” showed that the
distinction between activity and inactivity was a longstanding feature of
constitutional doctrine.
Pointing to prior decisions that make use of a given distinction is an excellent way to show that the distinction is not novel. But to read the Supreme Court’s pre-NFIB cases as giving force to (or even noticing) a distinction between the regulation of activity and the regulation of inactivity,
one must think that the words “activity” and “activities” in the quoted cases
were meant to be used in a limiting sense. One must think, that is, that
when the Lopez Court wrote “Where economic activity substantially affects
interstate commerce,” it had in mind that the word “activity” narrowed
the domain of the sentence by excluding anything properly described as
“inactivity.” Similarly, one must think that when the Wickard Court wrote
“even if appellee’s activity be local,” it meant to say that its analysis applied
only because Farmer Filburn was doing something “active,” and that the
Agricultural Adjustment Act could not have been validly written to reach
Filburn had he been “inactive” instead.
I doubt that the language of “activity” in those cases was meant to carry
those meanings. It seems to me more likely that that language in the quoted
sentences was used in a less precise way: not to name a category of “activity”
distinct from “inactivity” but as a general synonym for “stuff being regulated.”
I think, in other words, that when the Perez Court wrote “Where the class
of activities is regulated,” it meant the same thing that would be meant by
“Where the subject matter at issue is regulated”; and when the Wickard
Court wrote “even if appellee’s activity be local,” it meant the same thing
that would be meant by “even if the subject matter in this case were local.”
To support this view, I offer, as Exhibit A, the most revealing word in
the United States Reports. That word, unsurprisingly at this point in the
analysis, is “activity.” In particular, it is that word as it appears at the end
of a paragraph near the very beginning of NFIB’s joint dissent.
In their joint opinion, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito
adopted the view that the individual mandate of the ACA was beyond the
commerce power because that power authorizes Congress only to regulate
activity as opposed to inactivity. In a short introduction to their opinion,
they identified the stakes of the question. It is a fundamental principle, they
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insisted, that the Commerce Clause cannot reach “all private conduct.”5
They continued as follows:
That clear principle carries the day here. The striking case of Wickard
v. Filburn, which held that the economic activity of growing wheat,
even for one’s own consumption, affected commerce sufficiently
that it could be regulated, always has been regarded as the ne plus
ultra of expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence. To go beyond
that, and to say the failure to grow wheat (which is not an economic
activity, or any activity at all) nonetheless affects commerce and
therefore can be federally regulated, is to make mere breathing in
and out the basis for federal prescription and to extend federal
power to virtually all human activity.6

Again, the argument is clear. If the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress
to regulate inactivity as well as activity, then the federal government can
regulate everything. And that cannot be right.7
But read the paragraph carefully. When you get to the last three
words, slow down, and ask yourself what the word “activity” means in the
phrase “all human activity” here. It cannot possibly mean something distinct from “inactivity.” It can only mean something like “all of human existence, including not just activity but also inactivity.” The point of the
sentence, after all, is that the individual mandate extended congressional
regulation beyond “activity” (in the limiting sense) and into the domain of
5
6
7

NFIB at 647 (Opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.).
NFIB at 647-48 (Opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.).
Presumably, the Joint Dissenters did not mean to suggest that congressional power to
regulate inactivity would mean congressional power to pass any law whatsoever, because
the Constitution contains many affirmative prohibitions on what Congress can do. Even if
Congress possessed general legislative jurisdiction, it could not pass a law establishing a
religion or enacting a bill of attainder. What the joint dissenters should actually be understood to be arguing, therefore, is that congressional power to regulate inactivity would
mean congressional power to regulate anything except as prohibited by affirmative constitutional prohibitions. And it cannot be the case that Congress is limited only by affirmative
prohibitions, in their view, because it is a fundamental principle that Congress is limited by
the enumeration of its powers, even without respect to affirmative prohibitions. I think
that the proposition that Congress must be limited by its enumerated powers is wrong.
See Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576 (2014). But for present
purposes, what is important is understanding what the joint dissenters were saying, not
whether that statement was the best view of the relevant constitutional law.
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something that was not activity. So “activity” here cannot mean the limiting
thing that the Chief Justice and the joint dissenters claim it meant in prior
cases. It has to name something that does not distinguish between activity
and inactivity.
Four Justices of the Supreme Court signed the joint dissent. Those four
Justices employed sixteen law clerks. Apparently not one of those twenty
talented lawyers read this paragraph and said “Actually, wait – the word
‘activity’ is used here in too broad a sense.” Instead, every one of them
seems to have regarded this use of the word “activity” – which encompasses “inactivity” – as normal and appropriate.
The joint dissent in NFIB was not some little-noticed document to
which its signatories gave scant attention. The case was an era-defining
blockbuster, and everybody knew it. Whether commerce doctrine affords
significance to a distinction between activity and inactivity lay at the center
of the case. If ever there were a case in which Justices and law clerks
should have been finely attuned to that distinction, it was NFIB. No opinion
ever written has been more insistent than NFIB’s joint dissent about the
importance of that distinction. Yet even that opinion, in the paragraph
introducing the “clear principle” on which it insists, uses the word “activity”
in a way that fails to respect the distinction. It is the most revealing word
in the United States Reports.8
What it reveals should be obvious. If even the NFIB joint dissent used
“activity” to name something that does not distinguish between “activity”
and “inactivity,” there is little reason to think that Justices in earlier cases
where the activity/inactivity question was not relevant or discussed were
using the word in a more precise and limiting way. It makes much more
sense to think that they used it in the more general, nonlimiting way that
even the NFIB joint dissenters sometimes deployed. If so, the various uses
of the word “activity” in prior decisions do not suggest that prior commerce
doctrine contemplated a difference between the regulation of activity and
the regulation of inactivity. The attempt to present those prior uses of lan8

Truth to tell, I am not invested in its being the most revealing word in all of the United
States Reports. If someone has a candidate for a word that is yet more revealing, I see no
need to enter pitched battle on the question of who is entitled to claim the superlative.
The important point, which I hope is sufficiently established, is just that this one is pretty
revealing.
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guage as proof of the significance of that distinction thus stands revealed as
a distorting piece of revisionism.
It does not follow that Chief Justice Roberts and the joint dissenters
were wrong to think that the commerce power stops at the activity/
inactivity line. The refinement and modification of doctrine is a normal
aspect of decisionmaking in a common-law system, so the fact that a doctrinal distinction was unknown before a certain date does not suffice to prove
that that distinction could not be validly introduced thereafter. In my view,
the most important reason why the Chief Justice and the joint dissenters
were wrong on the commerce question in NFIB, as I believe they were, is
not that the activity/inactivity distinction was novel but that it makes little
sense as a tool for the rational shaping of the commerce power.9 But a great
deal of ink has been spilled on that question, and I do not propose to treat
it comprehensively here. The present subject is specifically the pedigree of
the action/inaction distinction, not its ultimate merits. That said, though
the pedigree issue does not exhaust the ultimate question, it is an important
piece of the picture – important enough that the ACA’s defenders thought
it worthwhile to press the claim that the distinction was newly minted and
that the distinction’s promoters thought it worthwhile to insist that it had
long been visible in the Court’s prior cases.
The willingness of five Justices to adopt the action/inaction distinction
in NFIB was not solely a function of their reading of caselaw, nor of their
reading of caselaw combined with their readings of constitutional text. It
was also partly a matter of the context in which the issue was presented.
Some and perhaps all of those Justices had a background sense that preexisting doctrine construed the commerce power too broadly, such that opportunities to pare it back would be welcome. It also seems safe to assume that
some and likely all of those Justices regarded the Affordable Care Act as a
9

Limiting that power on the basis of an action/inaction distinction has no tendency to
facilitate anything valuable about federalism, nor about any other aspect of the constitutional system, because it does not map anything about how the system should allocate
decisionmaking among its various decisionmaking institutions. Some readers may be
tempted by the thought that this limit does promote something valuable because any obstacle to federal lawmaking is valuable. I do not share that view. But if that view were
correct, it would still not be clear why an action/inaction distinction would be superior
to any other limitation that might be arbitrarily imposed.
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Seriously Bad Thing, whether for reasons of federalism10 or otherwise11
and probably both. But those background factors, important as they were,
would probably not have sufficed to prompt five Justices to say that an act
of Congress was beyond the commerce power unless they could articulate
that conclusion by reference to some rule. And not just any rule would do.
It would need to be a rule that seemed like the sort of thing that makes a
difference in legal analysis. One can distinguish laws signed by Presidents
in the morning from laws signed in the afternoon, but it is hard to imagine
that anything of legal significance could turn on the distinction. So no matter
how negatively a judge felt toward a particular federal statute, it would be
hard to get that judge to say that the statute exceeded Congress’s commerce
power because the bill was signed into law at 10:15 a.m.
The distinction between activity and inactivity is part of the lawyer’s
standard set of moves. It isn’t always the right distinction to draw, but every
judge recognizes it as the kind of thing that might matter. So when that
distinction was offered to five Justices who were keen to articulate limits
on Congress and would not have been sorry to see the ACA disappear, the
conditions were favorable for getting those Justices to construe prior
caselaw as favorable to their applying an action/inaction limit in the case
10

The ACA was the most ambitious federal regulatory scheme in more than a generation,
so it could easily trigger concerns about federal overreach. This is so even if the relevant
intuition about federalism was not articulable in terms of doctrinal categories. It could
also be rooted in a more inchoate sense of what should be done nationally and what locally.
11
Different kinds of factors are in play here. Within the register of small-c constitutionalism –
fundamental questions about structure and ethos, whether or not attached to specific parts
of the written Constitution – the ACA may have unsettled a general expectation that in
the American system, one makes one’s living in the capitalist market, subject to a set of
exemptions for people unable to do so like the elderly and the disabled. Less exaltedly,
one should not dismiss the fact that the ACA provoked strong opposition for nonconstitutional reasons sounding in policy and partisanship and that all five Justices who
accepted the action/inaction distinction were appointed by presidents from a political
party that maintained unanimous opposition to the ACA in both Houses of Congress.
Non-constitutional factors shouldn’t shape judicial attitudes on constitutional questions,
but sometimes they do. This is not to say that the Justices deliberately acted on the basis
of policy or partisan preferences; it is merely to note that decisionmakers (of all political
orientations) often engage in motivated reasoning, such that they are more willing to
accept arguments whose conclusions strike them as congenial than arguments running in
other directions.
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before them. And so they did. But in that endeavor, they needed to impute
to their predecessors a specialized use of language – specialized enough
that they themselves could not maintain it, even when they should most
have done so. Using the phrase “all human activity” in their moment of
peroration was a tell-tale blunder: Even if the joint dissenters believed in
perfectly good faith that their argument was correct, the marker they left
behind tells a different story.
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